--- And here I thought

--- And here I thought Libya was bad.

UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - Sudan won an uncontested election on
Tuesday to the United Nations' main human rights watchdog, prompting
the United States to walk out because of alleged ethnic cleansing in
the country's Darfur region. Sudan's delegate immediately shot back
that the U.S. delegation was "shedding crocodile tears" and turning a
blind eye to atrocities committed by U.S. soldiers in Iraq against
civilians as well as against prisoners.

The UN has no credibilty left. None. Whatsoever.

Posted by: Kathy at 10:16 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 95 words, total size 1 kb.

--- And here I thought

--- And here I thought Libya was bad.

UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - Sudan won an uncontested election on
Tuesday to the United Nations' main human rights watchdog, prompting
the United States to walk out because of alleged ethnic cleansing in
the country's Darfur region. Sudan's delegate immediately shot back
that the U.S. delegation was "shedding crocodile tears" and turning a
blind eye to atrocities committed by U.S. soldiers in Iraq against
civilians as well as against prisoners.

The UN has no credibilty left. None. Whatsoever.

Posted by: Kathy at 10:16 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 95 words, total size 1 kb.

Blogger needs to improve their

Blogger needs to improve their communication skills. Which is ironic,
don't you think, for a company that specializes in blogs?

Sometime yesterday afternoon, Blogger switched all the domain names on what seems to be all
the Blogger Blogs. If you found your way here via Google, take a peek
up at the domain name and realize that they've ditched the 'www'
routing. In the past you could either put in the 'www' or you could
leave it out---but either way you'd get here. Blogger apparently is
pushing for uniformity. You'll need to redo your bookmarks for this
site and any other Blogger Blogs you visit.
So, this is fine and dandy and I don't really have any issues with it. I
JUST WOULD HAVE APPRECIATED BEING TOLD ABOUT IT BEFORE THEY DID IT SO I
COULD HAVE WARNED MY READERS AND SIMULTANEOUSLY NOT WASTED HOURS LAST
NIGHT WONDERING WHAT THE HELL WAS GOING ON BECAUSE THE HUSBAND COULD
SEE THE SITE BUT I COULDN'T.

I don't think a little post on the log-in page would have been too much to ask, do you?

Update: It does make me feel strangely normal, though. Blogger
never tells you about this stuff until it's over with, if they bother
telling you about it at all. It's somewhat comforting in a weird sort
of way. Update 2: An observant commentator over at INDC Journal notes that it's BLOGSPOT
blogs that are affected and not all Blogger Blogs. I'd completely
forgotten that you could pay Blogger to host your site---hence those
people aren't affected. Forgive me for spreading lies, lies and more
damn lies!

Posted by: Kathy at 09:24 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 279 words, total size 2 kb.

Blogger needs to improve their

Blogger needs to improve their communication skills. Which is ironic,
don't you think, for a company that specializes in blogs?

Sometime yesterday afternoon, Blogger switched all the domain names on what seems to be all
the Blogger Blogs. If you found your way here via Google, take a peek
up at the domain name and realize that they've ditched the 'www'
routing. In the past you could either put in the 'www' or you could
leave it out---but either way you'd get here. Blogger apparently is
pushing for uniformity. You'll need to redo your bookmarks for this
site and any other Blogger Blogs you visit.
So, this is fine and dandy and I don't really have any issues with it. I
JUST WOULD HAVE APPRECIATED BEING TOLD ABOUT IT BEFORE THEY DID IT SO I
COULD HAVE WARNED MY READERS AND SIMULTANEOUSLY NOT WASTED HOURS LAST
NIGHT WONDERING WHAT THE HELL WAS GOING ON BECAUSE THE HUSBAND COULD
SEE THE SITE BUT I COULDN'T.

I don't think a little post on the log-in page would have been too much to ask, do you?

Update: It does make me feel strangely normal, though. Blogger
never tells you about this stuff until it's over with, if they bother
telling you about it at all. It's somewhat comforting in a weird sort
of way. Update 2: An observant commentator over at INDC Journal notes that it's BLOGSPOT
blogs that are affected and not all Blogger Blogs. I'd completely
forgotten that you could pay Blogger to host your site---hence those
people aren't affected. Forgive me for spreading lies, lies and more
damn lies!

Posted by: Kathy at 09:24 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 279 words, total size 2 kb.

Bunnysutra. Tourists visiting New York's

Bunnysutra.

Tourists visiting New York's Times Square are blushing over
a new Swatch watch billboard that features six pairs of rabbits in
various sexual positions, according to a Local 6 News report.
The billboard kicks off the new "Bunnysutra" Swatch watch line that
features the company's "touch" technology. A Swatch news release
reportedly says when touched, the clock hands land on "happy bunny
positions."

Posted by: Kathy at 02:00 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 74 words, total size 1 kb.

Bunnysutra. Tourists visiting New York's

Bunnysutra.

Tourists visiting New York's Times Square are blushing over
a new Swatch watch billboard that features six pairs of rabbits in
various sexual positions, according to a Local 6 News report.
The billboard kicks off the new "Bunnysutra" Swatch watch line that
features the company's "touch" technology. A Swatch news release
reportedly says when touched, the clock hands land on "happy bunny
positions."

Posted by: Kathy at 02:00 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 74 words, total size 1 kb.

In fact, it's freakishly large.

In fact, it's freakishly large.

protein wisdom: "Yes, working people left behind, blah blah
blah, gotcha. Seriously, though. It's like your neck gave birth to a
giant ham, if you don't mind my saying. I expect you can't wear any
kind of pullover sweaters, am I right? -- it's all V-necks for you...?"

There's mention of Godzilla as well.

Posted by: Kathy at 01:41 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 69 words, total size 1 kb.

In fact, it's freakishly large.

In fact, it's freakishly large.

protein wisdom: "Yes, working people left behind, blah blah
blah, gotcha. Seriously, though. It's like your neck gave birth to a
giant ham, if you don't mind my saying. I expect you can't wear any
kind of pullover sweaters, am I right? -- it's all V-necks for you...?"

There's mention of Godzilla as well.

Posted by: Kathy at 01:41 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 69 words, total size 1 kb.

Realism: Its Limitation and Contributions

Realism: Its Limitation and Contributions
{â€Â¦}Fundamental to the critique of realist theory was the questioning,
rejection or modification of the traditional paradigm of international
relations on which realism in its classical formulation was based.
Politics, defined as a struggle of power in a state-centric system
based on actors whose foreign polemics could be clearly separated from
domestic politics, had given way by the 1960s to a newer and more
complex paradigm, or model, of the international system. In place of
the Eurocentric realist paradigm came and international system global
in scope and containing an unprecedented number of states and nonstate
actors. To the extent that domestic politics shapes foreign policy, the
clearly defined separation assumed in realist theory became at least
blurred and at most a gross distortion of the complex process by which
state action takes place. According to John A. Vasquez, “realpolitik
explanations do not provide a theory of world politics, but merely an
image that decision makers can have of the world. Power politics is not
so much an explanation as a description of one type of behavior found
in the global political system. If this is correct, then power politics
behavior itself must be explained; it does not explain.” Reflecting
on other research of the 1970s as well as his own effort to test
propositions derived from realist theory, Vasquez concluded that those
that are “based on realist assumption do not do as well as those that
reject realist assumptions.”
For several reasons, the “national interest” concept has been the
object of criticism. According to one critique, “That national
interest is a necessary criterion of policy is obvious and
unilluminating. No statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously
argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or
disregard of, the national interest.” Moreover, it is difficult to
give operational meaning to the concept of national interest. Statesmen
are constrained, or given freedom, by many forces in interpreting the
national interest. They are often the captive of their predecessors̢۪
policies. They interpret the national interest as a result of their
cultural training, values, and the data made available to them as
decision-makers. According to Stanley Hoffman, “The conception of an
objective and easily recognizable national interest, the reliable guide
and criterion of national policy, is one which makes sense only in a
stable period in which the participants play for limited ends, with
limited means, and without domestic kibitzers to disrupt the players̢۪
moves. In a period when the survival of states is at stake to a far
greater extent than in former times, the most divergent course of
action can be recommended as valid choices for survival. Ordinarily
less compelling objectives, such as prestige, or an increment of power
in a limited area, or the protection of private citizens abroad, all
become tied up with the issues of survival and the most frequent
argument against even attempting to redefine the hierarchy of national
objectives so as to separate at least some of them from survival is the
familiar fear of a “chain of events” or a “row of dominoes.”
Therefore, in the absence of empirically based studies, it is difficult
to determine what “national interest” means at any specific time.
According to Michael Joseph Smith, realists, having adopted Weber̢۪s
ethic of responsibility, have not presented a competent set of criteria
for judging responsibility. Although, and perhaps because, they
minimize the relevance of ethics to international relations, they
appear no to recognize that “their judgment of morality and their
definition of the national interest rested on their own hierarchy of
values.” Among the focal points of neorealist analysis is an effort
to reformulate and refine the national interest concept with a
perceived calculus of benefits and losses in accordance with
alternative posited goals for the state. Specifically, the regime
concept includes an attempt to adapt national interest to a theoretical
framework related to state motivation in the formation of what are
defined as international regimes for collaboration or cooperation.
Realist writers, it has been noted, have been criticized for their
efforts to draw from the Eurocentric system of the past a series of
political concepts for the analysis of a vastly different contemporary
global international system. The pursuit of limited national
objectives, the separation of foreign policy from domestic politics,
the conduct of secret diplomacy, the use of balance of power as a
technique for the management of power, and the pleas for nations to
place reduced emphasis on ideology as a conditioner of international
conduct have little relevance to the international system today. By
urging that nations return to the practices of an earlier period, some
realist writers overestimate the extent to which such change in the
present international system is possible. If nations obey laws of
nature, which the realist purports to have discovered, why is it
necessary to urge them as realists do, to return to practices based on
such laws? Although history provides many examples of international
behavior that substantiate classical realist theory, historical data
offer deviant cases. In calling upon statesmen to alter their behavior,
the realist becomes normative in theoretical orientation and fails to
provide an adequate explanation as to why political leaders sometimes
do not adhere to realist tenets in foreign policy.
In emphasizing power as the principal motivation for political
behavior, realists have made themselves the object of criticism.
Critics have suggested that realist writers, for the most part, have
not clearly conceptualized power. {â€Â¦}
Neorealism and, specifically, structural realism have encountered
several criticisms, including an alleged disregard for history as a
process that is continually undergoing redefinition, in which
individuals contribute to the molding of each successive era. In this
respect, the neorealist is considered to have departed from classical
realism, which held that the statesman was shaped by but also had an
important influence on history. Far from being captives of a particular
system---itself a reification---the individual person holds the
potential to be the master of structures, not simply the object.
Moreover, neorealism is faulted for having presumably reduced politics
to those dimensions that are conducive to interpretation by reference
to rational behavior under various structural constraints. Because of
its own focus on structure, neorealism is said to have ignored the
social basis and social limits of power. Power cannot be reduced to
capabilities; instead power consists also of psychological factors such
as public morale and political leadership, as well as situational
factors and the extent to which power is exercised within a consensual,
contrasted with a conflictual, framework. The “state as actor”
world of neorealism is faulted for having imputed to the state the role
of unitary actor whose behavior is shaped by the structure of the
international system. Neorealism, it is suggested, was statist before
it was structuralist. In response, neorealists deny that realism is, in
fact, structural determinism. Although structural elements exert a
powerful constraining influence on political behavior, the neorealist
does not consider all of the human political conduct to be determined
by the structure within which the polity is organized nor does the
neorealist accept the criticism that the “state as actor” world
represents a negation of the role of those individuals or groups who
act as the actual decision makers. {â€Â¦}
Contending Theories of International Relations. James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Posted by: Kathy at 01:30 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 1224 words, total size 9 kb.

Realism: Its Limitation and Contributions

Realism: Its Limitation and Contributions
{â€Â¦}Fundamental to the critique of realist theory was the questioning,
rejection or modification of the traditional paradigm of international
relations on which realism in its classical formulation was based.
Politics, defined as a struggle of power in a state-centric system
based on actors whose foreign polemics could be clearly separated from
domestic politics, had given way by the 1960s to a newer and more
complex paradigm, or model, of the international system. In place of
the Eurocentric realist paradigm came and international system global
in scope and containing an unprecedented number of states and nonstate
actors. To the extent that domestic politics shapes foreign policy, the
clearly defined separation assumed in realist theory became at least
blurred and at most a gross distortion of the complex process by which
state action takes place. According to John A. Vasquez, “realpolitik
explanations do not provide a theory of world politics, but merely an
image that decision makers can have of the world. Power politics is not
so much an explanation as a description of one type of behavior found
in the global political system. If this is correct, then power politics
behavior itself must be explained; it does not explain.” Reflecting
on other research of the 1970s as well as his own effort to test
propositions derived from realist theory, Vasquez concluded that those
that are “based on realist assumption do not do as well as those that
reject realist assumptions.”
For several reasons, the “national interest” concept has been the
object of criticism. According to one critique, “That national
interest is a necessary criterion of policy is obvious and
unilluminating. No statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously
argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or
disregard of, the national interest.” Moreover, it is difficult to
give operational meaning to the concept of national interest. Statesmen
are constrained, or given freedom, by many forces in interpreting the
national interest. They are often the captive of their predecessors̢۪
policies. They interpret the national interest as a result of their
cultural training, values, and the data made available to them as
decision-makers. According to Stanley Hoffman, “The conception of an
objective and easily recognizable national interest, the reliable guide
and criterion of national policy, is one which makes sense only in a
stable period in which the participants play for limited ends, with
limited means, and without domestic kibitzers to disrupt the players̢۪
moves. In a period when the survival of states is at stake to a far
greater extent than in former times, the most divergent course of
action can be recommended as valid choices for survival. Ordinarily
less compelling objectives, such as prestige, or an increment of power
in a limited area, or the protection of private citizens abroad, all
become tied up with the issues of survival and the most frequent
argument against even attempting to redefine the hierarchy of national
objectives so as to separate at least some of them from survival is the
familiar fear of a “chain of events” or a “row of dominoes.”
Therefore, in the absence of empirically based studies, it is difficult
to determine what “national interest” means at any specific time.
According to Michael Joseph Smith, realists, having adopted Weber̢۪s
ethic of responsibility, have not presented a competent set of criteria
for judging responsibility. Although, and perhaps because, they
minimize the relevance of ethics to international relations, they
appear no to recognize that “their judgment of morality and their
definition of the national interest rested on their own hierarchy of
values.” Among the focal points of neorealist analysis is an effort
to reformulate and refine the national interest concept with a
perceived calculus of benefits and losses in accordance with
alternative posited goals for the state. Specifically, the regime
concept includes an attempt to adapt national interest to a theoretical
framework related to state motivation in the formation of what are
defined as international regimes for collaboration or cooperation.
Realist writers, it has been noted, have been criticized for their
efforts to draw from the Eurocentric system of the past a series of
political concepts for the analysis of a vastly different contemporary
global international system. The pursuit of limited national
objectives, the separation of foreign policy from domestic politics,
the conduct of secret diplomacy, the use of balance of power as a
technique for the management of power, and the pleas for nations to
place reduced emphasis on ideology as a conditioner of international
conduct have little relevance to the international system today. By
urging that nations return to the practices of an earlier period, some
realist writers overestimate the extent to which such change in the
present international system is possible. If nations obey laws of
nature, which the realist purports to have discovered, why is it
necessary to urge them as realists do, to return to practices based on
such laws? Although history provides many examples of international
behavior that substantiate classical realist theory, historical data
offer deviant cases. In calling upon statesmen to alter their behavior,
the realist becomes normative in theoretical orientation and fails to
provide an adequate explanation as to why political leaders sometimes
do not adhere to realist tenets in foreign policy.
In emphasizing power as the principal motivation for political
behavior, realists have made themselves the object of criticism.
Critics have suggested that realist writers, for the most part, have
not clearly conceptualized power. {â€Â¦}
Neorealism and, specifically, structural realism have encountered
several criticisms, including an alleged disregard for history as a
process that is continually undergoing redefinition, in which
individuals contribute to the molding of each successive era. In this
respect, the neorealist is considered to have departed from classical
realism, which held that the statesman was shaped by but also had an
important influence on history. Far from being captives of a particular
system---itself a reification---the individual person holds the
potential to be the master of structures, not simply the object.
Moreover, neorealism is faulted for having presumably reduced politics
to those dimensions that are conducive to interpretation by reference
to rational behavior under various structural constraints. Because of
its own focus on structure, neorealism is said to have ignored the
social basis and social limits of power. Power cannot be reduced to
capabilities; instead power consists also of psychological factors such
as public morale and political leadership, as well as situational
factors and the extent to which power is exercised within a consensual,
contrasted with a conflictual, framework. The “state as actor”
world of neorealism is faulted for having imputed to the state the role
of unitary actor whose behavior is shaped by the structure of the
international system. Neorealism, it is suggested, was statist before
it was structuralist. In response, neorealists deny that realism is, in
fact, structural determinism. Although structural elements exert a
powerful constraining influence on political behavior, the neorealist
does not consider all of the human political conduct to be determined
by the structure within which the polity is organized nor does the
neorealist accept the criticism that the “state as actor” world
represents a negation of the role of those individuals or groups who
act as the actual decision makers. {â€Â¦}
Contending Theories of International Relations. James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Posted by: Kathy at 01:30 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 1224 words, total size 9 kb.

Krauthammer gets it right. In

Krauthammer gets it right.

In any case, the whole Rumsfeld debate is a sideshow. For
partisans it is a convenient way to get at the president. And for those
who have no partisan agenda but are shocked by the Abu Ghraib pictures,
it is a way to try to do something, anything, to deal with the moral
panic that has set in about the whole Iraq enterprise. This panic is
everywhere and now includes many who have been longtime supporters of
the war. The panic is unseemly. The pictures are shocking and the
practices appalling. But how do the actions of a few depraved soldiers
among 135,000 negate the moral purpose of the entire enterprise --
which has not only liberated 25 million people from 25 years of
genocidal dictatorship but has included a nationwide reconstruction
punctuated by hundreds, thousands, of individual acts of beneficence
and kindness by American soldiers? We are obsessing about the wrong
question. It is not: Is our purpose in Iraq morally sound? Of course it
is. The question today, as from the beginning, remains: Is that purpose
achievable?

Go read the whole thing.

Posted by: Kathy at 01:28 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 198 words, total size 1 kb.

Krauthammer gets it right. In

Krauthammer gets it right.

In any case, the whole Rumsfeld debate is a sideshow. For
partisans it is a convenient way to get at the president. And for those
who have no partisan agenda but are shocked by the Abu Ghraib pictures,
it is a way to try to do something, anything, to deal with the moral
panic that has set in about the whole Iraq enterprise. This panic is
everywhere and now includes many who have been longtime supporters of
the war. The panic is unseemly. The pictures are shocking and the
practices appalling. But how do the actions of a few depraved soldiers
among 135,000 negate the moral purpose of the entire enterprise --
which has not only liberated 25 million people from 25 years of
genocidal dictatorship but has included a nationwide reconstruction
punctuated by hundreds, thousands, of individual acts of beneficence
and kindness by American soldiers? We are obsessing about the wrong
question. It is not: Is our purpose in Iraq morally sound? Of course it
is. The question today, as from the beginning, remains: Is that purpose
achievable?

Go read the whole thing.

Posted by: Kathy at 01:28 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 198 words, total size 1 kb.

At least that's what E.J.

At least that's what E.J. Dionne seems to think is preventing us from learning the hard lessons of that day:

All of which makes you want to ask Giuliani why he felt it
necessary to rebuke the commission investigating Sept. 11 for pointing
out important truths about what went wrong that day. In the
matter-of-fact way of its valuable staff reports, the commission
pointed to the turf battles and communication problems among New York
City's uniformed services that may have cost lives. Rudy, no one is
asking you to be perfect. No one, and I mean no one, is taking anything
away from the bravery of those who selflessly gave their all that day.
But the Sept. 11 commission has the responsibility for making us more
ready if a dreadful event of this sort happens again. They can't
overlook what went wrong. Alas, most things are personal for Rudy. "Our
enemy is not each other," he told the commission on Wednesday, "but
terrorists who attacked us, murdered our loved ones and continue to
offer a threat to our security." Of course that's right. But no one
says you're the enemy, Rudy. Yet none of us, certainly not you, would
want systems kept in place that threaten the very men and women whose
bravery protects us. Most of the commission members seemed thoroughly
intimidated by Giuliani and expressed their devotion. It fell to Bob
Kerrey, the Vietnam veteran who does not intimidate easily, to state an
important truth: "I don't believe it's an either/or choice of being
angry at those who perpetrated this crime and feeling anger towards
those with responsibility." Kerrey went on to praise Giuliani too, but
his point goes to the heart of the commission's challenge and manDATE: 05/01/2004
to overcome the mythologizing of Sept. 11 and face what happened.

Note that the fire and police chiefs of NYC had testified before the
9/11 Commission the day before and had been raked over the coals. Note
that Condoleeza Rice was bullied into giving public testimony even when
she'd already met with the commission for four hours in private. Note
that Richard Clarke, idiot extraordinaire, was lauded by the 9/11
Commission for essentially plugging a book and airing grudges he
apparently still held because he'd been cut out of the loop. Given
these examples of how non-partisan and how dedicated
these commissioners are to finding the truth of what happened on 9/11,
who on earth would expect Rudy Guiliani to go into that hearing room
and expect underhanded softballs to be thrown at him? Rudy was ready,
and now he's being berated for assuming a defensive posture. E.J.
apparently is nuts because he tells Rudy that "no one is asking you to
be perfect." Yes, they are. That's precisely what they're
asking. Everyone associated with these hearings, whether it be the
Jersey Girl widows the press is so fond of to the commissioners
themselves, expected everyone to be perfect that day---because
then no one would have died, would they?
If the 9/11 Commission wasn't playing partisan games with who they
decide to be harsh with and who they're not, it would be easy and right
to say that they're just trying to get to the bottom of things. The
truth, however, is that the 9/11 Commission is not
trying to get to the bottom of things. I'm sure a few of them have
deluded themselves into believing that mission statement, but in
actuality you have a bunch of has-beens up on a stage, with national
media coverage and they're surely enjoying the attention they're
receiving. So they puff themselves up; they make themselves to be more
important than they are; they lob softballs at the people they like and
then they throw Roger Clemens-style fastballs at the ones they don't. I
would make the argument that it's not the public, the White House or
Rudy Guiliani who is mythologizing 9/11. I believe it's people like
E.J. who seem to think that this commission will solve problems and
will help us to suss out how we could have been better prepared and how
our response could have been better. They're not going to solve a damn
thing. We won't learn anything we didn't already know about 9/11. We
just won't. Why? Because we don't live in a world where you can prepare
and be ready for the worst case scenario every day of our lives, which
is what they expect. It's just not feasible. We live in a world where
commissions are formed and don't do a damn thing in actuality. But most
importantly, we live in a world where shit happens. It does. While I am
more sorry than you can ever imagine for this next statement, the truth
is that shit happened on 9/11. There was nothing we could do to prevent
this; there was nothing we could to do to stave it off. Horrible things
happened on that day. But we simply cannot form a commission everytime
something bad and completely unexpected happens to prevent it from
happening again. People did their best on 9/11. Firemen, police
officers, the mayor---everyone did their best. Yet, because, in the
eyes of some, their best wasn't good enough, despite hurdles being
placed in their path that they had no way of clearing, there is
apparently room for improvement; there's truth to be sought; there's
grandstanding to be done. My question is, though, how can the truth be
found if the people asking the questions clearly aren't interested in
the answers?

Posted by: Kathy at 01:27 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 930 words, total size 6 kb.

At least that's what E.J.

At least that's what E.J. Dionne seems to think is preventing us from learning the hard lessons of that day:

All of which makes you want to ask Giuliani why he felt it
necessary to rebuke the commission investigating Sept. 11 for pointing
out important truths about what went wrong that day. In the
matter-of-fact way of its valuable staff reports, the commission
pointed to the turf battles and communication problems among New York
City's uniformed services that may have cost lives. Rudy, no one is
asking you to be perfect. No one, and I mean no one, is taking anything
away from the bravery of those who selflessly gave their all that day.
But the Sept. 11 commission has the responsibility for making us more
ready if a dreadful event of this sort happens again. They can't
overlook what went wrong. Alas, most things are personal for Rudy. "Our
enemy is not each other," he told the commission on Wednesday, "but
terrorists who attacked us, murdered our loved ones and continue to
offer a threat to our security." Of course that's right. But no one
says you're the enemy, Rudy. Yet none of us, certainly not you, would
want systems kept in place that threaten the very men and women whose
bravery protects us. Most of the commission members seemed thoroughly
intimidated by Giuliani and expressed their devotion. It fell to Bob
Kerrey, the Vietnam veteran who does not intimidate easily, to state an
important truth: "I don't believe it's an either/or choice of being
angry at those who perpetrated this crime and feeling anger towards
those with responsibility." Kerrey went on to praise Giuliani too, but
his point goes to the heart of the commission's challenge and manDATE: 05/01/2004
to overcome the mythologizing of Sept. 11 and face what happened.

Note that the fire and police chiefs of NYC had testified before the
9/11 Commission the day before and had been raked over the coals. Note
that Condoleeza Rice was bullied into giving public testimony even when
she'd already met with the commission for four hours in private. Note
that Richard Clarke, idiot extraordinaire, was lauded by the 9/11
Commission for essentially plugging a book and airing grudges he
apparently still held because he'd been cut out of the loop. Given
these examples of how non-partisan and how dedicated
these commissioners are to finding the truth of what happened on 9/11,
who on earth would expect Rudy Guiliani to go into that hearing room
and expect underhanded softballs to be thrown at him? Rudy was ready,
and now he's being berated for assuming a defensive posture. E.J.
apparently is nuts because he tells Rudy that "no one is asking you to
be perfect." Yes, they are. That's precisely what they're
asking. Everyone associated with these hearings, whether it be the
Jersey Girl widows the press is so fond of to the commissioners
themselves, expected everyone to be perfect that day---because
then no one would have died, would they?
If the 9/11 Commission wasn't playing partisan games with who they
decide to be harsh with and who they're not, it would be easy and right
to say that they're just trying to get to the bottom of things. The
truth, however, is that the 9/11 Commission is not
trying to get to the bottom of things. I'm sure a few of them have
deluded themselves into believing that mission statement, but in
actuality you have a bunch of has-beens up on a stage, with national
media coverage and they're surely enjoying the attention they're
receiving. So they puff themselves up; they make themselves to be more
important than they are; they lob softballs at the people they like and
then they throw Roger Clemens-style fastballs at the ones they don't. I
would make the argument that it's not the public, the White House or
Rudy Guiliani who is mythologizing 9/11. I believe it's people like
E.J. who seem to think that this commission will solve problems and
will help us to suss out how we could have been better prepared and how
our response could have been better. They're not going to solve a damn
thing. We won't learn anything we didn't already know about 9/11. We
just won't. Why? Because we don't live in a world where you can prepare
and be ready for the worst case scenario every day of our lives, which
is what they expect. It's just not feasible. We live in a world where
commissions are formed and don't do a damn thing in actuality. But most
importantly, we live in a world where shit happens. It does. While I am
more sorry than you can ever imagine for this next statement, the truth
is that shit happened on 9/11. There was nothing we could do to prevent
this; there was nothing we could to do to stave it off. Horrible things
happened on that day. But we simply cannot form a commission everytime
something bad and completely unexpected happens to prevent it from
happening again. People did their best on 9/11. Firemen, police
officers, the mayor---everyone did their best. Yet, because, in the
eyes of some, their best wasn't good enough, despite hurdles being
placed in their path that they had no way of clearing, there is
apparently room for improvement; there's truth to be sought; there's
grandstanding to be done. My question is, though, how can the truth be
found if the people asking the questions clearly aren't interested in
the answers?

Posted by: Kathy at 01:27 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 930 words, total size 6 kb.

Henry A. Kissinger Another scholar

Henry A. Kissinger
Another scholar who has drawn from history---in this case, diplomatic
history---is Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger̢۪s theory of international
relations is derived from his analysis of early nineteenth century
Europe. In A World Restored,
based on his doctoral dissertation, Kissinger wrote:
“The success of physical science depends upon the selection of the
“crucial” experiment; that of political science in the field of
international affairs, on the selection of the “crucial” period. I
have chosen for my topic, the period between 1812 and 1822, partly, I
am frank to say, because its problems seem to me analogous to those of
our day. But I do not insist on this analogy.”
Kissinger̢۪s fascination with this period lies in the insights that
might be provided in that the exercise of power by statesmen such as
Castlereagh and Metternich for the development of an international
structure that contributed to peace in the century between the Congress
of Vienna and the outbreak of WWI. Kissinger studied the nature and
quality of political leadership, the impact of domestic political
structures upon foreign policy, and the relationship between diplomacy
and military policy in stable and revolutionary international systems.
As Stephen R. Graubard has written:
“Kissinger saw choice as fundamental to the whole political process.
It was of greatest consequence to him that a given state opted for a
specific policy for one reason rather than another: because its
bureaucracy determined that here was only one safe course; because its
leaders were anxious to test the adversary̢۪s reactions; because
domestic opinion demanded a specific policy; because the political
leadership was confused and saw the necessity of creating the illusion
that it as still capable of action.”
Drawing heavily upon the 1815 to 1822 period, Kissinger postulates that
peace is achieved not as an end in itself, but instead emerges as the
result of a stable, contrasted with revolutionary, international
system. Therefore Kissinger develops two models for the study of
international politics: first, a stable system; and second, a
revolutionary system. He contends that stability has resulted not
“from a quest for peace but from a general accepted legitimacy.” By
Kissinger’s definition, legitimacy means “no more than an
international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and
about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.” Legitimacy
implies an acceptance of the framework of the international order by
all the major powers. Agreement among major powers upon the framework
of international order does not eliminate international conflicts, but
it limits their scope. Conflict within the framework has been more
limited than conflict about the framework. Diplomacy, which Kissinger
defines as “the adjustment of differences through negotiation,”
becomes possible only in the international systems where “legitimacy
obtains.” In Kissinger’s model the primary objective of national
actors is not to preserve the peace. In fact, “wherever
peace---conceived as the avoidance of war---has been the primary
objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has
been at the mercy of the most ruthless members of the international
community.” In contrast, “whenever the international order has
acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for
the sake of peace, stability based upon an equilibrium of forces was at
least conceivable.” {â€Â¦}
In other writings Kissinger has applied concepts derived from his study
of early nineteenth century European diplomatic history to the
contemporary international system. The problems posed by the great
destructive potential of nuclear weapons have been of great concern to
him. As in the past, it is necessary for nations to develop limited
means to achieve limited objectives. “An all or nothing military
policy willâ€Â¦play into the hands of the Soviet strategy of ambiguity
which seeks to upset the strategic balance by small degrees and which
combines political, psychological and military pressures to induce the
greatest degree of uncertainty and hesitation in the mind of the
opponent.” If United States policy makers are to have a choice other
than “the dread alternatives
of surrender or suicide,” they must adopt concepts of limited war
derived from the experience of nineteenth-century warfare. At that time
the objective of warfare “was to create a calculus of risks according
to which continued resistance would appear more costly than the peace
sought to be imposed.” A strategy of limited warfar would provide the
United States with the means to “establish a reasonable relationship
between power and the willingness to use it, between the physical and
psychological components of national policy.” Writing in the
1960̢۪s, Kissinger contended that if the United States was to avoid
the stark alternatives of suicide or surrender, it must have both
large-scale conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons. Kissinger
established three requirements for limited war capabilities.
1.The limited war forces must be able to prevent the potential
aggressor from creating a fait accompli.
2.They must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that their use,
although invoking an increasing risk of all-out war, is not an
inevitable prelude to it.
3.They must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds in conveying
that all-out war is not the sole response to aggression and that there
exists a willingness to negotiate a settlement short of unconditional
surrender. If nations are to evolved a limited war strategy, they must
develop an understanding of those interests that do not threaten
national survival. Decision makers must possess the ability to restrain
public opinion if disagreement arises as to whether national survival
is at stake. Given a tacit understanding among nations about the nature
of limited objectives, it is possible to fight both conventional
conflicts and limited nuclear wars without escalation to total war. In
the adjustment of differences between nations, Kissinger, like most
other realists, assigns an important role to diplomacy. Historically,
negotiation was aided by the military capabilities a nation could bring
to bear if diplomacy failed. The vast increase in destructive
capabilities has contributed to the perpetuation of disputes. “Our
age faces the paradoxical problem that because the violence of war has
grown all out of proportion to the objectives achieved, no issue has
been resolved.” {â€Â¦}
Like Morganthau, Kissinger views with disfavor the injection of
ideology into the international system. Ideology not only contributes
to the development of unlimited national objectives, but it also
eventually creates states whose goal is to overthrow the existing
international system. In the absence of agreement among powers about
the framework for the system---or its legitimacy---the conduct of
diplomacy becomes difficult, even impossible. Hence the emphasis in the
Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy upon creating stable structure for
the international system: “All nations, adversaries and friends
alike, must have a stake in preserving the international system. They
must feel that their principles are being respected and their national
interests secured. They must, in short, see positive incentive for
keeping the peace, not just the dangers of breaking it.” {â€Â¦}
Realist writers, Kissinger included, have often sought to separate
domestic politics from foreign policy. The conduct of an effective
diplomacy is said to be difficult, if not impossible, if it must be
subject, both in its conception and execution, to the continuous
scrutiny of public opinion in a democracy such as in the United States.
Flexibility, characteristic of Kissinger̢۪s style of diplomacy, can be
achieved in secrecy more easily than in a policy process open to the
glare of publicity.
But the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy has
been another dimension for realists, and especially for Kissinger.
Unlike those who subscribe to the Wilsonian idealism or utopianism,
Kissinger does not seek to transform domestic political structures in
the belief that democratic political systems are a prerequisite for a
peaceful world.
“We shall never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We
shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice.
But the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we
press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to
practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions?
... For half a century we have objected to Communist efforts to alter
the domestic structures of other countries. For a generation of Cold
War we sought to ease the risks produced by competing ideologies. Are
we not to come full circle and insist on domestic compatibility of
progress?”
Here Kissinger̢۪s theory of international relations contrasts sharply
with the view that a precondition for the development of a stable
relationship with the Soviet Union is the transformation of its
political system to conform with the principles of human rights and
political freedom cherished in the West. At most, the easing of
tensions between states is a complex process, dependent upon diplomacy,
mutual interest, and “a strong military balance and flexible defense
posture.” In short, foreign policy should be based on national power
and interest, rather than abstract moralistic principles or political
crusades. Nevertheless, in Kissinger̢۪s theory of international
relations the domestic political structure of states is a key element.
His stable and revolutionary system models of international politics,
noted earlier, are linked to the domestic political structures of
states in either system. Stale international regimes are characterized
by actors whose domestic political structures are based on compatible
notions about means and goals of foreign policies. By definition,
governments with stable domestic political structures do not resort to
revolutionary or adventuristic foreign policies to restore or preserve
domestic cohesion. In contrast, revolutionary systems contain actors
whose domestic political structures contrast sharply with each other.
{â€Â¦}

Contending Theories of International Relations James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr

Posted by: Kathy at 01:07 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 1587 words, total size 11 kb.

Henry A. Kissinger Another scholar

Henry A. Kissinger
Another scholar who has drawn from history---in this case, diplomatic
history---is Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger̢۪s theory of international
relations is derived from his analysis of early nineteenth century
Europe. In A World Restored,
based on his doctoral dissertation, Kissinger wrote:
“The success of physical science depends upon the selection of the
“crucial” experiment; that of political science in the field of
international affairs, on the selection of the “crucial” period. I
have chosen for my topic, the period between 1812 and 1822, partly, I
am frank to say, because its problems seem to me analogous to those of
our day. But I do not insist on this analogy.”
Kissinger̢۪s fascination with this period lies in the insights that
might be provided in that the exercise of power by statesmen such as
Castlereagh and Metternich for the development of an international
structure that contributed to peace in the century between the Congress
of Vienna and the outbreak of WWI. Kissinger studied the nature and
quality of political leadership, the impact of domestic political
structures upon foreign policy, and the relationship between diplomacy
and military policy in stable and revolutionary international systems.
As Stephen R. Graubard has written:
“Kissinger saw choice as fundamental to the whole political process.
It was of greatest consequence to him that a given state opted for a
specific policy for one reason rather than another: because its
bureaucracy determined that here was only one safe course; because its
leaders were anxious to test the adversary̢۪s reactions; because
domestic opinion demanded a specific policy; because the political
leadership was confused and saw the necessity of creating the illusion
that it as still capable of action.”
Drawing heavily upon the 1815 to 1822 period, Kissinger postulates that
peace is achieved not as an end in itself, but instead emerges as the
result of a stable, contrasted with revolutionary, international
system. Therefore Kissinger develops two models for the study of
international politics: first, a stable system; and second, a
revolutionary system. He contends that stability has resulted not
“from a quest for peace but from a general accepted legitimacy.” By
Kissinger’s definition, legitimacy means “no more than an
international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and
about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.” Legitimacy
implies an acceptance of the framework of the international order by
all the major powers. Agreement among major powers upon the framework
of international order does not eliminate international conflicts, but
it limits their scope. Conflict within the framework has been more
limited than conflict about the framework. Diplomacy, which Kissinger
defines as “the adjustment of differences through negotiation,”
becomes possible only in the international systems where “legitimacy
obtains.” In Kissinger’s model the primary objective of national
actors is not to preserve the peace. In fact, “wherever
peace---conceived as the avoidance of war---has been the primary
objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has
been at the mercy of the most ruthless members of the international
community.” In contrast, “whenever the international order has
acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for
the sake of peace, stability based upon an equilibrium of forces was at
least conceivable.” {â€Â¦}
In other writings Kissinger has applied concepts derived from his study
of early nineteenth century European diplomatic history to the
contemporary international system. The problems posed by the great
destructive potential of nuclear weapons have been of great concern to
him. As in the past, it is necessary for nations to develop limited
means to achieve limited objectives. “An all or nothing military
policy willâ€Â¦play into the hands of the Soviet strategy of ambiguity
which seeks to upset the strategic balance by small degrees and which
combines political, psychological and military pressures to induce the
greatest degree of uncertainty and hesitation in the mind of the
opponent.” If United States policy makers are to have a choice other
than “the dread alternatives
of surrender or suicide,” they must adopt concepts of limited war
derived from the experience of nineteenth-century warfare. At that time
the objective of warfare “was to create a calculus of risks according
to which continued resistance would appear more costly than the peace
sought to be imposed.” A strategy of limited warfar would provide the
United States with the means to “establish a reasonable relationship
between power and the willingness to use it, between the physical and
psychological components of national policy.” Writing in the
1960̢۪s, Kissinger contended that if the United States was to avoid
the stark alternatives of suicide or surrender, it must have both
large-scale conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons. Kissinger
established three requirements for limited war capabilities.
1.The limited war forces must be able to prevent the potential
aggressor from creating a fait accompli.
2.They must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that their use,
although invoking an increasing risk of all-out war, is not an
inevitable prelude to it.
3.They must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds in conveying
that all-out war is not the sole response to aggression and that there
exists a willingness to negotiate a settlement short of unconditional
surrender. If nations are to evolved a limited war strategy, they must
develop an understanding of those interests that do not threaten
national survival. Decision makers must possess the ability to restrain
public opinion if disagreement arises as to whether national survival
is at stake. Given a tacit understanding among nations about the nature
of limited objectives, it is possible to fight both conventional
conflicts and limited nuclear wars without escalation to total war. In
the adjustment of differences between nations, Kissinger, like most
other realists, assigns an important role to diplomacy. Historically,
negotiation was aided by the military capabilities a nation could bring
to bear if diplomacy failed. The vast increase in destructive
capabilities has contributed to the perpetuation of disputes. “Our
age faces the paradoxical problem that because the violence of war has
grown all out of proportion to the objectives achieved, no issue has
been resolved.” {â€Â¦}
Like Morganthau, Kissinger views with disfavor the injection of
ideology into the international system. Ideology not only contributes
to the development of unlimited national objectives, but it also
eventually creates states whose goal is to overthrow the existing
international system. In the absence of agreement among powers about
the framework for the system---or its legitimacy---the conduct of
diplomacy becomes difficult, even impossible. Hence the emphasis in the
Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy upon creating stable structure for
the international system: “All nations, adversaries and friends
alike, must have a stake in preserving the international system. They
must feel that their principles are being respected and their national
interests secured. They must, in short, see positive incentive for
keeping the peace, not just the dangers of breaking it.” {â€Â¦}
Realist writers, Kissinger included, have often sought to separate
domestic politics from foreign policy. The conduct of an effective
diplomacy is said to be difficult, if not impossible, if it must be
subject, both in its conception and execution, to the continuous
scrutiny of public opinion in a democracy such as in the United States.
Flexibility, characteristic of Kissinger̢۪s style of diplomacy, can be
achieved in secrecy more easily than in a policy process open to the
glare of publicity.
But the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy has
been another dimension for realists, and especially for Kissinger.
Unlike those who subscribe to the Wilsonian idealism or utopianism,
Kissinger does not seek to transform domestic political structures in
the belief that democratic political systems are a prerequisite for a
peaceful world.
“We shall never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We
shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice.
But the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we
press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to
practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions?
... For half a century we have objected to Communist efforts to alter
the domestic structures of other countries. For a generation of Cold
War we sought to ease the risks produced by competing ideologies. Are
we not to come full circle and insist on domestic compatibility of
progress?”
Here Kissinger̢۪s theory of international relations contrasts sharply
with the view that a precondition for the development of a stable
relationship with the Soviet Union is the transformation of its
political system to conform with the principles of human rights and
political freedom cherished in the West. At most, the easing of
tensions between states is a complex process, dependent upon diplomacy,
mutual interest, and “a strong military balance and flexible defense
posture.” In short, foreign policy should be based on national power
and interest, rather than abstract moralistic principles or political
crusades. Nevertheless, in Kissinger̢۪s theory of international
relations the domestic political structure of states is a key element.
His stable and revolutionary system models of international politics,
noted earlier, are linked to the domestic political structures of
states in either system. Stale international regimes are characterized
by actors whose domestic political structures are based on compatible
notions about means and goals of foreign policies. By definition,
governments with stable domestic political structures do not resort to
revolutionary or adventuristic foreign policies to restore or preserve
domestic cohesion. In contrast, revolutionary systems contain actors
whose domestic political structures contrast sharply with each other.
{â€Â¦}

Contending Theories of International Relations James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr

Posted by: Kathy at 01:07 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 1587 words, total size 11 kb.

--- Apparently kryshas are advertising

--- Apparently kryshas are advertising in Forbes

I was flipping through Forbes
when what to my wondering eyes should appear. This ad. Placed
prominently in a section on Russia and what a great country it is for
business!


Nice to see that they're getting all entreprenurial about the shakedowns, eh?

*I
should probably mention that this company could be completely
legitimate and I haven't done any googling to prove otherwise, but what
the hell, right? It's one in the morning, I should be in bed, but
instead of sleeping I'd rather post my unfounded assumptions because
I'm bored.

Posted by: Kathy at 12:59 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 108 words, total size 1 kb.

--- Apparently kryshas are advertising

--- Apparently kryshas are advertising in Forbes

I was flipping through Forbes
when what to my wondering eyes should appear. This ad. Placed
prominently in a section on Russia and what a great country it is for
business!


Nice to see that they're getting all entreprenurial about the shakedowns, eh?

*I
should probably mention that this company could be completely
legitimate and I haven't done any googling to prove otherwise, but what
the hell, right? It's one in the morning, I should be in bed, but
instead of sleeping I'd rather post my unfounded assumptions because
I'm bored.

Posted by: Kathy at 12:59 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 108 words, total size 1 kb.

Well, well, well. It appears

Well, well, well.

It appears hell has officially frozen over.

NAIVASHA, Kenya - Moving to end a 21-year civil war,
Sudan's government and rebels agreed on issues Tuesday that had
prevented a final peace deal, officials said. The parties still have to
agree on the details of a comprehensive cease-fire before the war —
which has led to the deaths of more than two million people — could
be declared over. Then it could take months to determine whether the
diplomatic solution will translate to peace on the ground.

It's about time. Still, I'm not holding my breath. Until there's a
solid cease fire in place with each side having a reason to keep the
peace, the war will rage on. Both sides are battle hardened. Peace will
not come easily. Hey, Kofi---how about some UN peacekeepers for the
south? Oh, wait you want them for Darfur. Not enough peacekeepers lying about either it seems.

Posted by: Kathy at 12:57 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 165 words, total size 1 kb.

Well, well, well. It appears

Well, well, well.

It appears hell has officially frozen over.

NAIVASHA, Kenya - Moving to end a 21-year civil war,
Sudan's government and rebels agreed on issues Tuesday that had
prevented a final peace deal, officials said. The parties still have to
agree on the details of a comprehensive cease-fire before the war —
which has led to the deaths of more than two million people — could
be declared over. Then it could take months to determine whether the
diplomatic solution will translate to peace on the ground.

It's about time. Still, I'm not holding my breath. Until there's a
solid cease fire in place with each side having a reason to keep the
peace, the war will rage on. Both sides are battle hardened. Peace will
not come easily. Hey, Kofi---how about some UN peacekeepers for the
south? Oh, wait you want them for Darfur. Not enough peacekeepers lying about either it seems.

Posted by: Kathy at 12:57 AM | No Comments | Add Comment
Post contains 165 words, total size 1 kb.