Critiques of Balance of PowerIn recent decades, the
balance of power theory has encountered much criticism even from
traditional analysts, and for reasons other than the semantic vagueness
mentioned earlier. Nicholas J. Spykman held that the theory
inadequately expressed the practice: “The truth of the matter is that
states are interested only in balance (imbalance) which is in their
favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective.
There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy;
there is security only in being a little stronger. There is no
possibility of action if one̢۪s strength is fully checked; there is a
chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force
which can be used freely.”
Hans J. Morgenthau finds the balance of power deficient on several
grounds. It has failed on a number of occasions since the end of the
eighteenth century to preserve the independent existence of states. The
multistate system precluding a single state from achieving universal
domination has been preserved only at a price of frequent and costly
wars. He finds the balance of power 1. uncertain because no completely
reliable means of measuring, evaluating and comparing power exist; 2.
unreal because statesmen try to compensate for its uncertainty by
aiming for superiority; and 3. inadequate for explaining national
restraint during most of the years from 1648 to 1914 because it does
not give credit to the restraining influence of the basic intellectual
unity and moral consensus then prevailing in Europe. Ernst B. Haas has
observed that using the balance of power as a policy guide assumes a
high degree of flexibility in national decision making. The vigilant
political leader must engage in a constant power calculus and be ready
to enter into a countervailing coalition, regardless of ideological
differences, economic interests, and domestic political attitudes. Haas
had questioned the degree to which policymakers, especially in
democratic countries, can enjoy the kind of flexibility that the
balance of power theory would seem to demand. It should be pointed out,
however, that the Anglo-American democracies managed to overcome their
aversion to Soviet communism in WWII against Nazi Germany, and in more
recent decades, the United States has apparently sought to play a
balance of power game vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China
and the {former} Soviet Union.
Kenneth N. Waltz had defended the balance of power theory against
critics who, in his view, have misunderstood certain crucial points.
Every theory, he argues, must begin with some assumptions. He assumes
that are unitary actors that see, at a minimum, to preserve themselves,
and at a maximum, to dominate others if possible. They strive to
achieve their objectives through internal efforts (e.g. strengthening
their own alliance and weakening that of the adversary). He then adds
the condition that states are operating in a self-help system with no
superior referee. Thos who do not help themselves as well as others do
will become disadvantaged. Assumptions, Waltz points out, are neither
true nor false, but they are essential for the construction of a
theory. In Waltz̢۪s theory of structural realism, the balance of power
is rooted inescapably and necessarily in the international system of
states. Thus he parts company with other theorists of the balance of
power---Hume, Churchill, Organski, Morgenthau, Haas, Kissinger, and
others---who have held that the balance of power policy is something to
be followed voluntarily by wise and prudent political leaders. For
Waltz, the tendency toward equilibrium is automatic, regardless of
whether “some or all states consciously aim to establish and maintain
a balance, or whether some or all states aim for universal
domination.” If the results to be produced (i.e. balance) depend upon
some or all states̢۪ consciously working for it, then international
politics can be explained by theories of national bureaucratic
policymaking, and an international balance of power theory would have
nothing to explain. Waltz wants a theory applicable to the
international system irrespective of the behavior of particular states.
Contending Theories of International Relations James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr

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