Henry A. Kissinger
Another scholar who has drawn from history---in this case, diplomatic
history---is Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger̢۪s theory of international
relations is derived from his analysis of early nineteenth century
Europe. In A World Restored,
based on his doctoral dissertation, Kissinger wrote:
“The success of physical science depends upon the selection of the
“crucial” experiment; that of political science in the field of
international affairs, on the selection of the “crucial” period. I
have chosen for my topic, the period between 1812 and 1822, partly, I
am frank to say, because its problems seem to me analogous to those of
our day. But I do not insist on this analogy.”
Kissinger̢۪s fascination with this period lies in the insights that
might be provided in that the exercise of power by statesmen such as
Castlereagh and Metternich for the development of an international
structure that contributed to peace in the century between the Congress
of Vienna and the outbreak of WWI. Kissinger studied the nature and
quality of political leadership, the impact of domestic political
structures upon foreign policy, and the relationship between diplomacy
and military policy in stable and revolutionary international systems.
As Stephen R. Graubard has written:
“Kissinger saw choice as fundamental to the whole political process.
It was of greatest consequence to him that a given state opted for a
specific policy for one reason rather than another: because its
bureaucracy determined that here was only one safe course; because its
leaders were anxious to test the adversary̢۪s reactions; because
domestic opinion demanded a specific policy; because the political
leadership was confused and saw the necessity of creating the illusion
that it as still capable of action.”
Drawing heavily upon the 1815 to 1822 period, Kissinger postulates that
peace is achieved not as an end in itself, but instead emerges as the
result of a stable, contrasted with revolutionary, international
system. Therefore Kissinger develops two models for the study of
international politics: first, a stable system; and second, a
revolutionary system. He contends that stability has resulted not
“from a quest for peace but from a general accepted legitimacy.” By
Kissinger’s definition, legitimacy means “no more than an
international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and
about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.” Legitimacy
implies an acceptance of the framework of the international order by
all the major powers. Agreement among major powers upon the framework
of international order does not eliminate international conflicts, but
it limits their scope. Conflict within the framework has been more
limited than conflict about the framework. Diplomacy, which Kissinger
defines as “the adjustment of differences through negotiation,”
becomes possible only in the international systems where “legitimacy
obtains.” In Kissinger’s model the primary objective of national
actors is not to preserve the peace. In fact, “wherever
peace---conceived as the avoidance of war---has been the primary
objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has
been at the mercy of the most ruthless members of the international
community.” In contrast, “whenever the international order has
acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for
the sake of peace, stability based upon an equilibrium of forces was at
least conceivable.” {â€Â¦}
In other writings Kissinger has applied concepts derived from his study
of early nineteenth century European diplomatic history to the
contemporary international system. The problems posed by the great
destructive potential of nuclear weapons have been of great concern to
him. As in the past, it is necessary for nations to develop limited
means to achieve limited objectives. “An all or nothing military
policy willâ€Â¦play into the hands of the Soviet strategy of ambiguity
which seeks to upset the strategic balance by small degrees and which
combines political, psychological and military pressures to induce the
greatest degree of uncertainty and hesitation in the mind of the
opponent.” If United States policy makers are to have a choice other
than “the dread alternatives
of surrender or suicide,” they must adopt concepts of limited war
derived from the experience of nineteenth-century warfare. At that time
the objective of warfare “was to create a calculus of risks according
to which continued resistance would appear more costly than the peace
sought to be imposed.” A strategy of limited warfar would provide the
United States with the means to “establish a reasonable relationship
between power and the willingness to use it, between the physical and
psychological components of national policy.” Writing in the
1960̢۪s, Kissinger contended that if the United States was to avoid
the stark alternatives of suicide or surrender, it must have both
large-scale conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons. Kissinger
established three requirements for limited war capabilities.
1.The limited war forces must be able to prevent the potential
aggressor from creating a fait accompli.
2.They must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that their use,
although invoking an increasing risk of all-out war, is not an
inevitable prelude to it.
3.They must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds in conveying
that all-out war is not the sole response to aggression and that there
exists a willingness to negotiate a settlement short of unconditional
surrender. If nations are to evolved a limited war strategy, they must
develop an understanding of those interests that do not threaten
national survival. Decision makers must possess the ability to restrain
public opinion if disagreement arises as to whether national survival
is at stake. Given a tacit understanding among nations about the nature
of limited objectives, it is possible to fight both conventional
conflicts and limited nuclear wars without escalation to total war. In
the adjustment of differences between nations, Kissinger, like most
other realists, assigns an important role to diplomacy. Historically,
negotiation was aided by the military capabilities a nation could bring
to bear if diplomacy failed. The vast increase in destructive
capabilities has contributed to the perpetuation of disputes. “Our
age faces the paradoxical problem that because the violence of war has
grown all out of proportion to the objectives achieved, no issue has
been resolved.” {â€Â¦}
Like Morganthau, Kissinger views with disfavor the injection of
ideology into the international system. Ideology not only contributes
to the development of unlimited national objectives, but it also
eventually creates states whose goal is to overthrow the existing
international system. In the absence of agreement among powers about
the framework for the system---or its legitimacy---the conduct of
diplomacy becomes difficult, even impossible. Hence the emphasis in the
Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy upon creating stable structure for
the international system: “All nations, adversaries and friends
alike, must have a stake in preserving the international system. They
must feel that their principles are being respected and their national
interests secured. They must, in short, see positive incentive for
keeping the peace, not just the dangers of breaking it.” {â€Â¦}
Realist writers, Kissinger included, have often sought to separate
domestic politics from foreign policy. The conduct of an effective
diplomacy is said to be difficult, if not impossible, if it must be
subject, both in its conception and execution, to the continuous
scrutiny of public opinion in a democracy such as in the United States.
Flexibility, characteristic of Kissinger̢۪s style of diplomacy, can be
achieved in secrecy more easily than in a policy process open to the
glare of publicity.
But the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy has
been another dimension for realists, and especially for Kissinger.
Unlike those who subscribe to the Wilsonian idealism or utopianism,
Kissinger does not seek to transform domestic political structures in
the belief that democratic political systems are a prerequisite for a
peaceful world.
“We shall never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We
shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice.
But the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we
press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to
practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions?
... For half a century we have objected to Communist efforts to alter
the domestic structures of other countries. For a generation of Cold
War we sought to ease the risks produced by competing ideologies. Are
we not to come full circle and insist on domestic compatibility of
progress?”
Here Kissinger̢۪s theory of international relations contrasts sharply
with the view that a precondition for the development of a stable
relationship with the Soviet Union is the transformation of its
political system to conform with the principles of human rights and
political freedom cherished in the West. At most, the easing of
tensions between states is a complex process, dependent upon diplomacy,
mutual interest, and “a strong military balance and flexible defense
posture.” In short, foreign policy should be based on national power
and interest, rather than abstract moralistic principles or political
crusades. Nevertheless, in Kissinger̢۪s theory of international
relations the domestic political structure of states is a key element.
His stable and revolutionary system models of international politics,
noted earlier, are linked to the domestic political structures of
states in either system. Stale international regimes are characterized
by actors whose domestic political structures are based on compatible
notions about means and goals of foreign policies. By definition,
governments with stable domestic political structures do not resort to
revolutionary or adventuristic foreign policies to restore or preserve
domestic cohesion. In contrast, revolutionary systems contain actors
whose domestic political structures contrast sharply with each other.
{â€Â¦}

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